that grants excessive importance to Perrault and Madame d'Aulnoy: the emancipation from
the canon opens a large field of comparative research that is unpredictable, such as the per-
petual reconfiguration of the narrative.

Discours et Correspondance: La plume et la tribune II.
Michel de l'Hospital. Ed. Loris Petris.

Reviewed by: James H. Dahlinger, SJ
Le Moyne College

This is the second in Loris Petris's proposed three-volume edition of works of Hospital,
superbly presented by Droz press, and it is mainly devoted to the chancellor's own texts.
In his preface, Jean Céard notes the scarcity of editions available. Indeed Robert Desci-
mon's 1993 edition of the Discours, as well as the collection of anniversary papers edited by
Thierry Wanegffelen in 2002, are among the very few works dedicated to Hospital to appear
in current times. In his fine introduction, Petris describes difficulties so often attendant
upon efforts to reconstruct the past. He notes that Hospital destroyed numbers of his own
papers and was understandably reticent to commit his observations to paper in a perma-
nent way. In these initial pages, Petris paints a vivid impression of the climate of the times.

He presents the text of Hospital's Discours to the parliaments of Rouen, Paris, and
Moulins with copious and useful notes. Petris insists further that the dignity of the individ-
ual was always of primary concern for Hospital, whether in his verse, his correspondence,
and his discourses. This is particularly important in his call for impartiality in judging cases.
He notes in the Discours at Rouen that "Justice is a chaste and pure virgin,... also with clean
hands" (51). Magistrates La Vaquerrie and Rollin are held up respectively as examples of the
poor but admirable judge, and the one who died wealthy, presumably from the prolonging
of trials with their fees, as well as by taking bribes. Hospital bluntly recalls the arrogance
and partiality of many judges who also defy or reinterpret the king's will. For them the law
is so much wax to be molded as they wish (51). If one cannot be honest, one should refrain
from the office of judge, he declares.

Petris presents the texts of Hospital's Discours addressed to the parliaments of Rouen
and Paris, both from 1563 (and Paris, 1567). In these speeches he conducts a general exami-
nation of conscience as he passes in review the topoi of the good and the bad judge as well
as the transparency of conduct that parliament owes to the king. In the speech in Rouen, his
text particularly reveals lyrical elements as he assesses nature as in turns mère et marastre
and he reflects on the changability of persons, times, and kingdoms. Once again these are
topoi ambient in the period. The speeches contain minimal Latin citations, particularly
from Horace, that would become désuète by late in the century, especially during actual
trials in court. In the Discours to the Paris Parliament of 1567 he denounces nepotism in
the process of nominations to office. In brief, the Discours offer a window on the legal pro-
cedures and abuses of the 1560s.

The second part of the volume offers correspondence received and sent by Hospital
for the years 1536–73, and these letters demonstrate the conventions of officialdom in the
period. Hospital, who was careful of which papers he allowed to be seen (or found), displays
his enviable relationships with Henri II, Charles IX, and Pius IV, as well as with Pibrac,
the Cardinal de Lorraine, and Turnebus, among others. Letters in Latin are presented by
Petris with their French equivalents. Annexes offer, respectively, Hospital's very revelatory
Testament, together with a translation by Brantôme; André Thévet's encomiastic commentary on the Testament; and Turnebus's dedication of his Adversaria to Hospital. This second volume in Loris Petris's highly careful and rich treatment of Hospital's works is a much needed instrument that promotes a more complete understanding of personages and their behavior during the Wars of Religion.

The Lying Mirror: The First-Person Stance and Sixteenth-Century Writing.

James Helgeson.


Reviewed by: Jeff Kendrick
Virginia Military Institute

In The Lying Mirror, James Helgeson continues to probe questions of textual agency that he considered in 2001 with his Harmonie divine et subjectivité poétique (Geneva: Droz) and took up again in the 2005 article “Harmony, Anamorphosis and the Conceptual Scheme” (Romanic Review). In this latest case, Helgeson examines the effect of the first-person stance on the interpretation of sixteenth-century literature by exploring the ethical construction of the “I.” While maintaining a safe distance from the thorny questions regarding the “self” in the sixteenth century, Helgeson outlines a theory of socially based interaction between writer and a community of readers and applies it to a wide variety of first-person texts in order to look at issues of truthfulness and agency and to nuance accepted readings of familiar passages.

The book’s introduction provides a helpful summary of work done on identity construction in the Renaissance while defining key terms such as “intentionality” that recur throughout the work. A discussion on the difference between “self” (that inner “us-ness”) and “ethos” (that which we project to the outside world) and the author’s preference for the latter conclude the preatory remarks.

The first of the two principal parts of the book lays the theoretical framework upon which the analysis of the second part rests. The former section is divided into three chapters. Helgeson begins by pointing out problems that arise from connecting the first-person stance to the idea of “selfhood” and successively examines texts dealing with perspective. Works by Leon Battista Alberti, Descartes, Pascal, Wittgenstein, and Montaigne suggest that a more cognitive model focusing more on the directness of the author, or his intention, and alterations between the first and third person might clarify our understanding of what sixteenth-century people understood or believed about the entity later thinkers would term the “self.”

In the next two chapters, the author goes on to challenge the notion of reading the “self” in the “other.” Although Helgeson’s use of Erasmus’s Adages, Montaigne’s musings on friendship and cannibalism, and the case of Arnauld du Tilh’s impersonation of Martin Guerre highlights the strengths of metaphors such as mirrors when talking about the fusion of souls, these instances also question accepted convention about seeing oneself in the other. Lying and its relationship to meaning take center stage in the third chapter of this section. Augustine’s criteria for truthfulness in De mendacio serve as the foundation for the discussion of dishonest speech acts that extends to twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinkers. The reader is guided through detailed definitions of early modern concepts surrounding sincerity such as voluntas, sentential, mens, intellectus, and sensus as Helgeson methodically argues for applying an “internalist, representationalist and mentalist theory